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EBA · EU-wide

Manipulation of the payer — the EU name for APP fraud

Fintech Passport
August 20, 2026 · 9-min read
Manipulation of the payer — the EU name for APP fraud

What the market calls authorised push payment (APP) fraud, EU supervisory reporting calls manipulation of the payer — and the official definition is narrower than the market’s. Under the EBA Guidelines on fraud reporting under PSD2 (EBA/GL/2018/05, as amended), it covers payment transactions made as a result of the payer being manipulated by the fraudster to issue a payment order, or to instruct the provider to do so, in good faith, to a payment account it believes belongs to a legitimate payee.

1. The three elements of manipulation of the payer

Guideline 1.1 splits reportable fraud into two categories: (a) unauthorised payment transactions and (b) manipulation of the payer. Category (b) requires three elements, all of which have to hold.

ElementWhat it requiresWhy it matters
Manipulation by the fraudsterThe payer acted because they were deceivedExcludes buyer’s remorse and disputes about goods supplied
The payer issues the order (or instructs the provider to)The transaction is authorised by the payerThis is what puts it outside the unauthorised category entirely
In good faith, to an account believed to belong to a legitimate payeeA genuine belief about the identity of the payeeExcludes a complicit payer, which is a mule question rather than a fraud-reporting one

The decisive question is who issued the order. The guidelines treat “modification of a payment order by the fraudster” — intercepting and altering a legitimate order in transit — as an unauthorised transaction. If the payer typed the fraudster’s IBAN themselves, it is manipulation; if the fraudster changed it in transit, it is not.

2. Where it sits in the reporting templates

PSD2 Article 96(6) requires providers to send statistical fraud data to their competent authority at least annually; the EBA guidelines set the reporting frequency at every six months, and the authorities pass the data on in aggregated form to the EBA and the ECB. Manipulation of the payer is not one line but a fraud type repeated across the data breakdowns in Annex 2:

BreakdownLine wordingWhere it appears
A — Credit transfersManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment orderRemote and non-remote, under both SCA and non-SCA branches
B — Direct debitsManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to consent to a direct debitElectronic mandate and other forms of consent
Card payments (issuer and acquirer sides)Manipulation of the payer to make a card paymentRemote and non-remote, SCA and non-SCA
Cash withdrawalsManipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawalAlongside issuance by the fraudster
F — E-money payment transactionsManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment orderRemote and non-remote, SCA and non-SCA

The classification is exclusive: for credit transfers, the three fraud types must add up to the fraudulent total of each SCA or non-SCA branch, and each transaction goes to one sub-category per row. Each breakdown also carries losses per liability bearer — the reporting provider, the payment service user, and others — recorded in the period the loss is booked and without taking insurance refunds into account.

3. Who bears the loss under PSD2

The refund regime most practitioners know does not reach this category. Article 64 PSD2 treats a transaction as authorised when the payer has given consent in the agreed form. Article 73 — the refund by the end of the following business day — applies to unauthorised transactions, and Article 74’s limits on payer liability (the EUR 50 cap, the gross-negligence exception) are likewise framed around unauthorised transactions. A manipulated payer consented.

What applies instead is Article 88 on incorrect unique identifiers. An order executed in accordance with the unique identifier is deemed correctly executed with regard to the payee that identifier specifies, and the provider is not liable under Article 89. Two obligations survive: the payer’s provider must make reasonable efforts to recover the funds, with the payee’s provider cooperating, and if recovery fails it must give the payer, on written request, all available information relevant to a legal claim.

4. Verification of payee from 9 October 2025

The Instant Payments Regulation, (EU) 2024/886, inserted Article 5c into the SEPA Regulation (EU) No 260/2012. It applies to credit transfers in euro generally, not only instant ones, and changes the liability picture at the margin:

  • The check. The payer’s provider must verify the payee immediately after the payer enters the payee details and before the payer can authorise the transfer, whatever the channel. Where IBAN and name do not match, the payer is told that authorising may send funds to an account not held by the intended payee; where they almost match, the payer is shown the name actually associated with the IBAN.
  • No hard block. Providers must ensure the check does not prevent the payer from authorising. The payer keeps the final decision.
  • Free of charge to all payment service users (Article 5b).
  • Bulk opt-out. Non-consumers may opt out for payment orders submitted as a package, and opt back in at any time.
  • Liability. A provider that has met Article 5c is not liable for execution to an unintended payee on the basis of an incorrect unique identifier under Article 88. If the payer’s provider failed to provide the service and that failure results in a defectively executed transaction, it must refund the payer without delay; where the failure lay with the payee’s provider, that provider compensates the payer’s provider.
  • Dates. Euro-area providers by 9 October 2025; providers in non-euro Member States by 9 July 2027.

Providers must also tell users what ignoring a mismatch notification means for liability and refund rights — so its wording is a compliance artefact, not a UX detail.

5. How it is counted

Three counting rules shape the picture materially. Only transactions that were initiated and executed are reported; prevented transactions blocked before execution on suspicion of fraud are excluded, so successful interventions never appear. The transaction is reported regardless of whether the amount has been recovered, so recovery success shows only in the loss figures. And a series counts transaction by transaction: a payer coached into five transfers is five fraudulent transactions, each recorded on its execution date.

Fraud is reported from detection, whether or not the case is closed, and revisions to past periods up to one year old go in the next reporting window.

6. Worked scenarios

Scenario 1 — the “safe account” call. Facts: A consumer receives a call from someone posing as the provider’s fraud team, is told the account is compromised and, during the call, makes three SCA-authenticated transfers from the app to an IBAN the caller supplies, under a name the caller dictates. The verification of payee check returns “no match”; the consumer, coached, proceeds. Rule: manipulation of the payer — the consumer issued the orders in good faith; Article 64 consent was given; Article 88 applies; Article 5c was performed. What the practitioner does: reports three transactions under credit transfers, remote, SCA-authenticated, manipulation of the payer; launches recovery with the payee’s provider immediately; keeps the evidence that the no-match notice was shown. Outcome: no PSD2 refund obligation arises; any amount recovered reduces losses, not the transaction count. Had the check not been performed and that failure caused defective execution, the Article 5c(8) refund duty would arise.

Scenario 2 — invoice redirection against a business. Facts: A company’s accounts team receives an email, apparently from a supplier, announcing new bank details, and pays the next invoice to the new IBAN. Rule: if the accounts team entered the new IBAN, this is manipulation of the payer. If instead the fraudster had altered a legitimate order inside the payment channel, it would be modification of a payment order — an unauthorised transaction under Article 73. What the practitioner does: establishes, from logs, who entered the IBAN before classifying; checks whether the payment was part of a package for which the customer had opted out of verification. Outcome: classification turns on the log, not the customer’s description; an opt-out the provider handled in line with Article 5c(6) and (7) leaves the provider within the Article 88 position.

Scenario 3 — the shared one-time code. Facts: A caller persuades a consumer to read out a one-time passcode, then initiates a transfer from a new device. Rule: the consumer did not issue the order; the fraudster did. This is an unauthorised transaction (“issuance of a payment order by the fraudster”), not manipulation of the payer, even though deception was involved. What the practitioner does: handles it under Article 73, assessing any Article 74 gross-negligence argument case by case. Outcome: reported in a different line with a different liability analysis — so intake must ask who pressed “send”.

7. Where the controls actually sit

Because the payer authenticates correctly, the effective controls are not authentication controls:

  • Payee verification, done well: notifications that say plainly what a mismatch means, and close-match results that show the real name.
  • Behavioural monitoring: first payment to a new payee, an unusual amount, a payment made during a long inbound call.
  • Friction that interrupts a script: a dismissable warning does not break real-time coaching; a step requiring an unscripted response can.

FAQ

Is manipulation of the payer the same as APP fraud?

It is the EU supervisory reporting term for the same phenomenon, with a defined test: manipulation, an order issued by the payer, and a good-faith belief about the payee’s identity.

Does strong customer authentication prevent it?

No. The payer authenticates genuinely. The templates carry the fraud type under SCA-authenticated transactions as well as non-SCA ones for exactly that reason.

Does PSD2 give the victim a right to a refund?

Not as such. Article 73 refunds cover unauthorised transactions. For a manipulated but authorised payment, Article 88 applies: no execution liability, but a duty to make reasonable efforts to recover and to provide information for a legal claim. A refund duty arises under Article 5c(8) of the SEPA Regulation where the payer’s provider failed to provide verification of payee and that caused defective execution. National law or ADR outcomes may go further.

What if the payer was complicit?

Then the good-faith element fails and it is not manipulation of the payer. That scenario belongs to money-mule and account-misuse analysis instead.

Does the Payment Services Regulation change this?

The proposed regulation addresses impersonation fraud, but until a final text is published in the Official Journal, the position above rests on PSD2, the SEPA Regulation and the EBA guidelines.

8. What to do, today

  • Map every fraud case to “who issued the order” before classifying; keep the log evidence with the case.
  • Retain proof that the verification-of-payee check ran and what the payer saw, for every euro credit transfer.
  • Review the wording of mismatch notifications and the liability information given to users.
  • Start Article 88(3) recovery the day the case is reported, and record recoveries as losses, not reclassifications.

Related: The supervisory fraud taxonomy · Verification of Payee · PSD2 fraud reporting · Payment exception management — rejects, returns, recalls

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