The MiCA transition is over — what the close of CASP grandfathering on 1 July 2026 means

The MiCA transitional regime for crypto-asset service providers expired on 1 July 2026. There is no extension mechanism, and the simplified authorisation route closed with it. Article 143(3) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 let firms that were lawfully providing crypto-asset services before 30 December 2024 carry on under national law for a defined window. That window is now shut everywhere in the Union — earlier in several member states, which used a power most firms never read. This walks through what the provision actually said, what closure means for a firm still trading, and what an authorisation now costs in time.

1. What Article 143(3) actually said

The wording matters because it contains two end-points, not one. Crypto-asset service providers that provided their services in accordance with applicable law before 30 December 2024 could continue to do so until 1 July 2026 or until they were granted or refused an authorisation pursuant to Article 63, whichever is sooner.

The second limb is the one that catches people. A firm that applied early and was refused lost the benefit of the transitional regime on the date of refusal — it did not get to keep trading until July 2026 while it appealed or reapplied. Grant and refusal both terminate the window; only the calendar terminates it for firms that never applied.

Note also what the provision required at the front end: services provided in accordance with applicable law before 30 December 2024. A firm operating in a member state that had no crypto registration regime, or operating outside the terms of the registration it held, was never inside Article 143(3) at all. The transitional regime protected lawful incumbents, not incumbency as such.

2. The two national levers, and the notification nobody reads

Article 143(3) then gave member states a discretion that produced a patchwork. They could decide not to apply the transitional regime at all, or to reduce its duration, where they considered their national framework applicable before 30 December 2024 to be less strict than MiCA. By 30 June 2024, member states had to notify the Commission and ESMA whether they had exercised that option and, if so, the duration they had set.

So 1 July 2026 was a ceiling, not a common date. Luxembourg ran the full window to 1 July 2026; Germany shortened it, with legacy crypto-custody authorisations under the Kreditwesengesetz running to 31 December 2025 at the latest under the national implementing act. Both are covered in our notes on CASP authorisation in Luxembourg and CASP authorisation in Germany.

3. What closure actually means

Article 59(1) is the operative prohibition. A person may provide crypto-asset services in the Union only where it is a legal person or other undertaking authorised as a crypto-asset service provider under Article 63, or one of the financial entities allowed to provide crypto-asset services under Article 60 — a credit institution, central securities depository, investment firm, market operator, electronic money institution, UCITS management company or alternative investment fund manager, each on notification.

Article 59(5) adds a second, separate prohibition that survives independently of whether any service is actually provided: a person who is not a crypto-asset service provider must not use a name or corporate name, issue marketing communications, or undertake any other process suggesting that it is one, or likely to create confusion in that respect. A firm that has paused its service but left its website describing it as a regulated crypto platform is still capable of breaching Article 59(5).

Facts: a firm registered under a pre-MiCA national regime applied for CASP authorisation in early 2026, has not yet had a decision, and is still serving clients on the basis that its national registration remains on the public register.

What the rule says: the national registration is no longer a legal basis to provide crypto-asset services. Article 143(3) was the bridge, and it expired on the national end-date. A pending application is not a permission — Article 59(1) requires an authorisation granted under Article 63, and Article 143(3) does not extend for firms whose application is merely outstanding.

What the practitioner does: stops providing in-scope services in that member state and takes the question to the competent authority in writing rather than inferring tolerance from a stale register entry. Whether run-off, client transfer or suspension is available is a supervisory conversation with a documented answer, not a judgement to make internally.

4. The simplified procedure is spent

Article 143(6) allowed member states, by derogation from Articles 62 and 63, to apply a simplified procedure for authorisation applications submitted between 30 December 2024 and 1 July 2026 by entities that, on 30 December 2024, were authorised under national law to provide crypto-asset services. The relief was procedural only: competent authorities still had to ensure that Chapters 2 and 3 of Title V were complied with before granting authorisation.

That window is defined by the date of submission. An application filed on 30 June 2026 could use it; one filed in July 2026 cannot, whatever the applicant’s history. Every application from here runs the full Article 62 and 63 route, which means a former incumbent and a newcomer now file the same dossier.

5. What a full authorisation now requires

Article 59(2) sets the substance test that most cross-border structures have to work around. A CASP authorised under Article 63 must have a registered office in a member state where it carries out at least part of its crypto-asset services, its place of effective management in the Union, and at least one director resident in the Union. This is a real-presence requirement in the state of authorisation, not a letterbox permission.

Authorisations are also service-specific. Article 59(6) requires competent authorities to specify in the authorisation which crypto-asset services the firm may provide, drawn from the ten in Article 3(1), point (16): custody and administration on behalf of clients; operation of a trading platform; exchange of crypto-assets for funds; exchange for other crypto-assets; execution of orders on behalf of clients; placing; reception and transmission of orders; advice; portfolio management; and transfer services on behalf of clients.

Facts: a firm authorised for exchange and custody wants to add a transfer service for clients, and treats it as a product launch rather than a regulatory change.

What the rule says: Article 59(8) requires a firm seeking to add services to request an extension of its authorisation from the authority that granted the initial one, by complementing and updating the Article 62 information — and the request is processed under Article 63, the same assessment route as the original.

What the practitioner does: puts the extension request on the critical path of the launch plan rather than alongside it, and checks the internal governance process treats a new crypto-asset service as an authorisation event. The new-product approval process is where this should be caught.

6. The passport, which is what the authorisation buys

Article 59(7) is the payoff and the reason the authorisation is worth the substance requirement. An authorised CASP may provide crypto-asset services throughout the Union, either through the right of establishment — including through a branch — or through the freedom to provide services. And a CASP providing services cross-border is not required to have a physical presence in the territory of a host member state.

That is the structural difference between the transitional regime and the target state. A national registration under a pre-MiCA framework was good in one member state; an Article 63 authorisation is good in twenty-seven. Firms that treated the transition as a compliance cost rather than a market-access change tended to file late, which is how the simplified window was missed.

7. The one transitional deadline still running

Not everything in Article 143 has expired. Under Article 143(2), for crypto-assets other than asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens that were admitted to trading before 30 December 2024, only limited requirements applied — but operators of trading platforms must ensure by 31 December 2027 that a crypto-asset white paper is, where the Regulation requires one, drawn up, notified and published in accordance with Articles 6, 8 and 9, and updated in accordance with Article 12. Articles 7 and 9 have applied to marketing communications published after 30 December 2024 throughout.

For a platform operator carrying a long legacy listing tail, that is a backfill project with a fixed end date and no simplified route — and it is the transitional obligation most likely to be forgotten now that the authorisation deadline has passed. Article 143(1) is genuinely closed: Articles 4 to 15 do not apply to offers to the public that ended before 30 December 2024.

8. FAQ

9. What to do, today

• If you are still providing services on a legacy basis: establish in writing, per member state, what your authorisation basis is today. A register entry that has not been updated is not a permission.
• Marketing and web estate: audit for Article 59(5) exposure. Holding yourself out as a CASP is a distinct breach from providing services without authorisation, and it is the easier one for a supervisor to evidence.
• Service scope: map what you actually do against the ten services in Article 3(1), point (16), and against what your authorisation specifies under Article 59(6). Extensions run the full Article 63 route.
• Platform operators: build the 31 December 2027 white-paper backfill plan now — it is the only Article 143 deadline still open, and the legacy listing inventory is the long pole.
• Group structures: confirm the Article 59(2) substance sits in the authorising state, and use the Article 59(7) passport rather than replicating entities across host states.

Related: CASP authorisation in Luxembourg · CASP authorisation in Germany · Drafting a MiCA white paper · E-money tokens under MiCA